The loss of land and water to industry and urbanisation

Thus is it not really surprising that a Californian utility should recently have paid $1,750 per acre-foot for water in Utah where local farmers were only paying $25 per acre-foot. As Stokes notes,

“Allocating a scarce resource such as water solely through the market-place may work against society’s broader interests by encouraging some farmers to sell all their water and stop producing food.”

Apparently, some farmers have already made that choice. Indeed, in certain parts of Arizona, the lack of water is so acute that entrepreneurs wishing to set up new mining enterprises have actually bought up farms and then closed them down in order to have access to their water supply.

That trade-off between development and food production may make short-term sense in a country like the United States which still has a considerable food surplus; it is clearly nonsensical, however, in the countries of the Third World where every scrap of food is needed to feed their massive and generally malnourished populations. In such countries, industrialisation can only be achieved at the expense of decreased agricultural production. It is a trade-off which cannot be avoided. It is also a trade-off which – despite the denials of Third World governments and development agencies alike – can only result in the death of many more people through starvation.

By way of example, let us look again at the Egyptian experience.

Table 9: Water requirements for selected industries (USA)

Industry	Unit	Range of water requirements per unit of product
Steel	ton	8,000- 61,000
Soap	ton	960 – 37,000
Gasoline	kilolitre	7,000 – 34,000
Paperboard	ton	62,000-376,000
Sugar beets	ton	1,800- 20,000

From: Asit K. Biswas et al (eds), Water Management for Arid Lands in Developing Countries, Pergamon, 1980, p18

Egypt: water for food or water for industry?

Despite Egypt’s poor economic performance over the last few years, the Egyptian government foresees the economy booming in the decades to come. To that end, there are ambitious plans afoot both to expand industry (in particular, petrochemicals, iron and steel production, aluminium smelting and fertiliser production) and to set up various large-scale agro-industrial projects such as sugar refineries and canning plants.

The government concedes that those development schemes will increase considerably the demand for electricity. According to 1979 estimates, for instance, industry will require 85 billion KWh by the year 2000 – 17 times the amount consumed in 1973. To provide that power, the government announced plans in 1979 to build a number of nuclear power stations.

In addition, a 100 km canal is to be built from the Mediterranean to the Qatarra Depression – the plan being to generate 50 billion KWh (five times the output of the Aswan High Dam) as the water flows through a series of turbines on its way down the canal. The Qatarra Depression itself will be transformed into a vast salt lake with an area of 19,500 square kilometres. [23]

Despite those plans for industrial expansion, the Egyptian government insists that the rate of industrial water consumption will remain constant at 1 billion cubic metres (m3) a year until the end of the century – a figure which also includes domestic water consumption. [24] Quite how the government justifies that figure is hard to fathom. If its development plans materialise, then, as Waterbury points out, industrial water consumption is likely to be “far in excess of anything the Ministry of Irrigation is willing to contemplate.” [44]

Indeed, Waterbury himself estimates that by 1990 industry alone will consume 3 billion m3 : if he is right, then 6.5 billion m3 are likely to be needed by the same date in order to cover all Egypt’s non-agricultural water needs. [25] Professor El Kinawy estimates that 4.5 billion cubic metres will be needed to cover non-agricultural water needs by the year 2000. USAID’s figures of 4 billion cubic metres is lower still.

So too, domestic water consumption is almost certain to rise dramatically as Egypt’s urban elite (those who will be the first to benefit from any economic growth which occurs) begin to install the material trappings of affluence – the dishwashers, washing machines, swimming pools and other water-intensive symbols of economic success.

Nonetheless, the Egyptian Ministry of Irrigation remains adamant that domestic water consumption will remain constant until the end of the century at an unspecified percentage of the 1 billion m3 which the government estimates to be the joint requirement for both domestic and industrial use. It is surely difficult to find a more blatant example of wishful thinking.

That same element of wishful thinking is evident in other official assumptions as to Egypt’s future water budget. Thus, the government – anxious to allay fears of a trade-off between industry and agriculture – insists that there will be sufficient water available to satisfy the needs of both sectors of the economy. In fact, it claims, there will be enough water to enable a further 4,625,000 feddans to be reclaimed and irrigated by the end of the century. [26] That claim, however, is based on a number of shaky assumptions as to the likely availability of water:

Firstly, the government takes for granted the ‘official credo’ that the amount of water released at Aswan is 55 billion cubic metres. That figure rests on the questionable premise that water losses to evaporation and seepage at Lake Nasser are as low as 11 billion m3. Waterbury, however, considers that the true rate of water loss is closer to 15 billion m3. [27]

The government’s figures are based on the further assumption that an extra 7 billion m3 will be made available by various minor water development projects in Upper Egypt, the Sudan and Ethiopia. Those schemes include seasonal storage dams on the Siwi, Yei and Busseri Rivers: and embankment, channelling and diversion projects on the Yei, Naam, Jel, Jelimar, Jur, Jeti, Pongo, Jol and Hehr-el Arab.

It is also assumed that 4 billion m3 will be provided by the massive water storage scheme being planned on the Upper Baro River in Ethiopia. [28] Those water projects – together with the widening of the Jonglei Canal in order to double its discharge – are expected to increase the water yield at Aswan by 18 billion m3, with half of that yield being made available (in theory at least) by the end of the century. [29]

But will the various schemes be built in time to stave off a water shortage in Egypt? Where will the money come from to pay for the projects? And, even if they are, will they provide enough water for Egypt’s growing needs? All those questions are fraught with uncertainties. Indeed, Waterbury argues that, of all the proposed projects, only the Jonglei Canal Scheme is likely to be built by the turn of the century.

Thirdly, the government estimates that 12 billion m3 of drainage water can be recovered for agricultural use, as against the 2.5 billion m3 recovered at present. Re-using drainage water, however, poses considerable problems – not least because it is highly saline and must therefore be diluted with fresh water before being applied again on the land. Waterbury considers that the total amount of water which can be recovered through improved drainage schemes will not exceed 4-6 billion m3 – that is, half (and possibly a third) of the figure projected by the government. [30]

Fourthly, the government’s calculations assume that the lining and covering of irrigation canals will reduce seepage and evaporation losses by 3.5 billion m3 – from 11.2 billion m3 to an estimated 7.7 billion m3 . Waterbury, however, doubts that such a reduction will be achieved, largely because of the vast expense involved in lining and covering canals. Moreover, if the area under irrigation is expanded (as the government intends) then the losses due to seepage and evaporation are likely to increase still further.

On the demand side, too, the government’s figures are questionable. The government foresees having 11.3 million feddans under cultivation by the end of the century, with 39.9 billion m3 of water being required for irrigation. In fact, the water requirements for irrigating 11.3 million feddans are likely to be far higher than the government forecasts.

One reason, according to Dr. I. Z. Kinawy, is that the extent of ‘on farm wastage’ (and thus the amount of water required per feddan) has been generally underestimated. Waterbury agrees: indeed, he argues that if the government’s plans to irrigate 11,333,172 feddans come to fruition, then (on the basis of El Kinawy’s figures for ‘on farm wastage’) the total water requirements for Egypt’s agricultural sector could be 43.3 billion m3 – as against the 39.9 billion m3 projected by the government. [31]

In fact, if the poor record of past reclamation schemes is anything to go by, it would seem probable that the amount of land under cultivation at the end of the century will be far lower than the government plans. Water needs for agriculture are thus likely to be lower than predicted. USAID, for example, considers that no more than 6.2 million feddans will be under cultivation and that water requirements will not exceed 26 billion m3 . El Kinawy sees 10,837,000 feddans under cultivation.

It should also be noted that the type of crops which the government intends to cultivate (cotton, for example) consume far more water than traditional subsistence crops.

The Egyptian government’s ‘water budget’ for the next two decades would thus seem wildly optimistic. Put bluntly, Egypt is unlikely to have enough water to pursue its dual programme of industrial and agricultural expansion. At the very least, argues Waterbury, the country will be faced with a ‘water deficit’ of 7.7 billion m3 by 1990. At worst – and Waterbury considers this a more realistic possibility – that deficit is likely to be as high as 14.1 billion m3, a figure that takes into account both domestic and industrial consumption. [38]

Clearly, the Egyptian government is trying to have its cake and eat it. It is surely only a question of time before the government is brought rudely down to earth by growing water shortages. As Waterbury puts it:

“Egypt cannot have it all ways. Cities in the desert, population transfers, millions of new cultivated acres, more intense use of old acres, heavy industrialisation, self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs: all bear water prices in excess of what Egypt can pay.”

In particular, future plans for industrial development make it almost inconceivable that Egypt will achieve its goal of self-sufficiency in food supplies by the year 2000 – a goal which, according to Mustapha al-Gabali, a former Minister of Agriculture, would require a cropped area of some 22 million feddans. As Waterbury writes,

“There is simply no way to find fresh water for that kind of acreage (assuming that one could find the acres) at acceptable costs. Egypt must begin to weigh all projects in awareness that water is already a limited resource. That fact has only just begun to sink in, and many misconceived projects may be launched before it influences policies.” [33]

Waterbury’s point is even more relevant to India. We have already noted that there are large parts of India which are officially referred to by the Ministry of Agriculture of ‘drought-affected’. Those areas, Malin Falkenmark notes, “contain 56 million hectares of cultivated land out of the country’s total of 160 million hectares.” [34] What is more, they are inhabited by 100 million people – most of whom, it might be added, already suffer from varying degrees of malnutrition.

Unfortunately, on the basis of current Government plans, there is to be a massive increase in water use for wasteful large-scale irrigation projects and, also, for urban and industrial use (see Table 10).

Those plans are, of course, totally unrealistic; the water required will simply not be available. Indeed, according to Falkenmark requirements will exceed dependable flow very quickly in some states (Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra) and later in others (Arunachal and Andhra Pradesh) but it will do so in all states by 2000. [35] (See Table 11).

As this occurs, one can predict that in the ensuing cut-throat competition for ever scarcer water supplies, the latter will be made available (as in the USA) to the highest bidders – and that means to the urban and industrial sector first, to the export-oriented large plantations next, and to the peasants who make up the vast bulk of the population last. The result can only be large scale famine – a prospect which is admitted privately by many in government circles.

Table 10: Estimated water use and projected water requirements in India

Water use in India	1973 / 1974 (km3 / year)	%	2000 km3 / year	%
Rural domestic	6.7	1.4	16.4	1.1
Urban domestic	5.7	1.2	14.6	1.0
Industrial	4.5	0.9	55.4	3.7
Steam electric power	12.6	2.6	86.8	5.8
Irrigation	452.2	92.9	1,314.0	87.9
Livestock	4.8	1.0	7.0	0.5
Total	487.0	100.0	1,494.0	100.0
% of ultimate utilisable resource	50%		150%

Source: Carl Widstrand (Ed), Water Conflicts and Research Priorities, Pergamon, 1980.

Table 11: Approximate year when water demand in India will exceed ultimate utilisable resources

State	1975-1980	1980-1985	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000
Punjab	.	.	.	X
Haryana	.	.	X
Rajasthan	.	.	.	X
Gujarat	.	X
Uttar Pradesh	.	X
Madhya Pradesh	.	.	X
Bihar	.	.	.	.	X
Arunachal	.	.	X
West Bengal	.	X
Orissa	.	.	.	X
Andhra Pradesh	.	.	.	.	X
Tamil Nadu	X
Kerala	.	.	X
Kamataka	.	.	X
Maharashtra	.	X

Source: Carl Widstrand (Ed), Water Conflicts and Research Priorities, Pergamon, 1980.

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References

1. Carrying Capacity: Report on the Carrying Capacity of the USA, unpublished, undated, Chapter 6, p.26.

2. Ibid, Chapter 6, p.26.

3. David Pimentel, quoted by Peter Freeman, Environmental Considerations in the Management of International Rivers: A Review, Threshold Foundation, Washington DC, 1978, p.14.

4. Michael Brewer and Robert Boxley, The Potential Supply of Cropland, Paper presented at RFF Symposium on the Adequacy of Agricultural Land, Washington DC. Quoted by Neil Sampson, ‘Land for Energy or Land for Food?’ The Ecologist Vol. 12 No. 2, 1982, p.69.

5. Neil Sampson, ‘Land for Energy or Land for Food?’, The Ecologist Vol. 12 No. 2, 1982, p.69.

6. Ibid, p.67.

7. Edward Goldsmith, ‘Planning for Starvation’, The Ecologist, Vol. 7 No. 2, March 1977, p.42.

8. Alice Coleman, ‘Is Planning really necessary?’, The Geographical Journal Vol. 142, part 3, November 1976. Quoted by Edward Goldsmith, op.cit. 1977, p.42.

9. Alice Coleman, op.cit. 1976, paraphrased by Edward Goldsmith, op.cit. 1977, p.44.

10. Alice Coleman, op.cit. 1976. paraphrased by Edward Goldsmith, op.cit. 1977, p.42.

11. Asit K. Biswas, ‘Loss of Productiver Land’, Ecologist Quarterly, Autumn 1978, p.210.

12. Ibid, pp.210-211.

13. John M. Bradley, ‘Nile Studies finds high dam did more good than harm’, World Environment Report, February 28, 1983, p.1.

14. Mohammed Kassas. The same point is made by Susan Walton though her figures are again different. She writes “In addition to the acreage converted to year-round cultivation, about 950,000 acres of desert land have been reclaimed for agriculture. But since this gain is partially cancelled out by the loss of 600,000 acres to urban expansion – and by additional acreage lost to shoreline erosion along the Mediterranean – the net gain of agricultural land is slight.” (see Egypt: After the Aswan Dam, Environment Vol. 23 No. 4 May 1981,

15. John Waterbury, The Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley, Syracuse University Press, 1979, p.138.

16. Ibid, p.139.

17. Ibid, p.140.

18. Not too much importance should be attached to these figures as water policy in the USA will have to be seriously reconsidered in the forthcoming years.

19. Carrying Capacity, op.cit. (undated), p.28.

20. Ibid, p.30.

21. Asit K. Biswas, ‘Water: A Perspective on Global Issues and Politics’, in Asit K. Biswas et. al. (Eds), Water Management for Arid Lands in Developing Countries, Pergamon, Oxford, 1978, p.18.

22. Bruce Stokes, Bread and Water: Growing Tomorrow’s Food, unpublished Paper prepared for the Worldwatch Institute, Washington DC, undated (circa. 1980), section 3, p.7.

23. John Waterbury, op.cit. 1979, p.150.

24. Ibid, p.223.

25. Ibid, p.224.

26. Ibid, pp.226-227.

27. Ibid, p.225.

28. Ibid, p.215.

29. Ibid, p.216.

30. Ibid, p.216.

31. Ibid, p.220.

32. Ibid, p.226.

33. Ibid, p.231.

34. Malin Falkenmark, ‘Water and Land: Interdependent but manipulated resources’ in Carl Widstrand (Ed), Water Conflicts and Research Priorities, Pergamon, Oxford, 1980, p.54.

35. Ibid, p.54.