Gaia and evolution

Neo-Darwinsm: the dogma of reductionist science

Since there is absolutely no evidence for the neo-Darwinist thesis, and since it fits in so very poorly with our knowledge of the world of living things, the only reason why it should prove so durable seems to be that it fits in so well with the paradigm of reductionist science and hence with the world view of modernism that the latter so faithfully reflects.

This was the view of Michael Polanyi, who wrote:

“Neo-Darwinism is firmly accredited and highly regarded by science though there is little direct evidence for it because it fits in beautifully with the mechanistic system of the universe and bears on the subject – the origin of man – which is of the utmost intrinsic interest.”

This was also the view of Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who considered:

“that a theory so vague, so insufficiently verifiable and so far from the criteria otherwise applied in ‘hard’ science, has become a dogma, can only be explained on sociological grounds. Society and science have been so steeped in the ideas of mechanism, utilitarianism, and the economic concept of free competition that instead of God, selection was enthroned as ultimate reality.”

Many biologists are now involved in developing a new post-Darwinian evolutionary theory. Such a theory, if it is to be a realistic one, is likely to clash with, rather than conform to, the paradigm of reductionist science, for which reason it is unlikely to be accepted until such time as that paradigm itself undergoes considerable change – and indeed itself become more realistic.

This process is already under way. The paradigm of reductionist science is under assault across a broad front. Its transformation is indeed necessary because, among other things, it faithfully reflects the world view of modernism, which serves above all to rationalise and hence to validate the Promethean enterprise to which modern society is committed, a path that is leading to the systematic annihilation of the world of living things.

Indeed, if humans are to survive for very long, one of the requirements of their survival will be the replacement of the paradigm of reductionist science by a new ecological paradigm. This new paradigm would also reflect a very different world view, one that would serve to rationalise and hence validate a society committed to systematically reducing the impact of our economic activities on the ecosphere and, thereby, to the extent that this is still possible, of restoring the proper functioning of the Gaian process that can alone assure that our planet remain habitable.

A post-Darwinian evolutionary theory

According to the Gaia hypothesis, the biosphere, together with its atmospheric environment, forms a single entity or natural system. This system is the product of organic forces that are highly co-ordinated by the system itself. Gaia has, in effect, created herself, not in a random manner but in a goal-directed manner since the system is highly stable and is capable of maintaining its stability in the face of internal and external challenges. It is, in fact, a cybernetic system, and for this to be possible, Gaia must display considerable order, indeed, she must be seen as a vast co-operative enterprise,very much as nature was seen by the ‘natural theologists’ of the 19th century.

Such a view of the world of living things is, needless to say, totally incompatible with neo-Darwinism. Indeed, an evolutionary theory that would be consistent with this view of the world would be the very negation of neo-Darwinism. I shall suggest what some of its features might be:

Gaia as the unit of evolution

If Gaia is a single natural system that has created herself in a co-ordinated and goal-directed way, then Gaia is clearly the unit of evolution, not the individual living thing as neo-Darwinists insist.

Gaia is Evolution:

Gaia is not just a contemporaneous organisation of living things. She is a spatio-temporal system. It is difficult for us to grasp the notion of a spatio-temporal system as our language makes a clear distinction between things and processes and our thinking is clearly influenced by our language. It is nevertheless essential that we realise that all living things have a temporal as well as a spatial component. They exist in time just as much as in space. This means that Gaia is not only an entity but also a process, and what is that process if it is not evolution?

If this is so, then the Gaian process – or evolution – must display the same fundamental structure as Gaia does when seen as a spatial entity). If the latter is a biological, social and ecological structure, then the Gaian process cannot possibly be merely physical and mechanical as the neo-Darwinists tell us; it must clearly also be seen in biological, social and ecological terms.

Gaia as a total spatio-temporal system

But what part of the temporal process must be seen as evolving? We assume that it must be the contemporaneous process, the one occurring before our eyes. But how do we justify this assumption? I suggest that the total process is involved, stretching back into the mists of time. The reason for suggesting this is that the information passed on from generation to generation of living things must, if the system is to display continuity and stability, reflect the experience of the total spatio-temporal system involved and not just part of it.

This information appears to be organised hierarchically, the most general information, that which reflects the longest experience, being particularly non-plastic, the more particular information, that which reflects the more recent experience, being very much more plastic and hence more easily adaptable to short-term environmental contingencies. This arrangement is clearly that which best assures the continuity or the stability of the total spatio-temporal Gaian system. If this is so, this means, among other things, that evolution is a long-term strategy not just a set of ad hoc adaptations.

Evolution as a living process

If Gaia creates herself, then the living world must be seen as dynamic and creative, not as passive and robot-like. The qualities that are tacitly attributed to the vague undefined ‘environment’ must be ascribed as well to the living things which it is seen as managing. Evolution is thereby no longer the mere product of natural selection from random variations or genetic mutations, but of living things exhibiting all those features whose involvement in the evolutionary process neo-Darwinists have been at such pains to deny.

Evolution as a cybernetic process

If Gaia is evolution, then evolution must also be a cybernetic process. Lovelock’s ‘Daisy World’ model is a cybernetic process but a very rudimentary one. One must suppose that the cybernetic process that led to the development of a system as complex as Gaia herself must be very much more sophisticated.

Now we are beginning to understand how living cybernetic processes operate. Human behaviour, as Kenneth Craik was the first to show, is mediated on the basis of a mental model on an individual’s relationship with his environment, in the light of which diversions from the appropriate pattern of behaviour are corrected.

Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff and others have shown how the behaviour of tribal groups in Amazonia is controlled in similar fashion, the model of the tribe’s relationship with its environment being formulated in the language of its mythology. I do not think that it is too outlandish to ask whether Gaia herself is not endowed with a similar model?

What is certain is that a cybernetic system must be capable of monitoring its responses otherwise it could not correct diversions from its optimum course, and hence maintain its homeorhesos and thereby its stability. How then is evolution monitored? There can only be one answer and that is ontogenetically and behaviourally.

That such feedback must occur has been clear to serious students of evolution for a long time. Baldwin, Lloyd Morgan, Goldschmidt, Waddington and Schmallhausen have all proposed mechanisms that might achieve this. The case for such feedback is put very forcefully by Piaget in his excellent book, Le Comportement Moteur de I ‘Evolution. The whole issue becomes much clearer, of course, once it is realised that the information that serves to mediate evolution is not just genetic but is formulated in different informational media including the cultural medium.

Evolution is a goal-directed process

If evolution is a cybernetic process, then it must be goal-directed. The reason should be clear. To say that a process is under control means that it is maintaining itself on its optimum course or ‘chreod’ as Waddington referred to it, that which will enable it to achieve its optimum end-state or goal – a baby in the case of the embryological process, the climax ecosystem in the case of an ecological one. This implies that there is an optimum course and also that there is an end-state or goal. If there is not, then the very notion of control becomes meaningless.

Once a system has achieved its end-state, then to say that it is under control is to say that it is capable of maintaining itself at that end-state or thereabouts, that it is in fact homeostatic. Again, this implies that there is an end-state. If there was not, then clearly it could not maintain itself there. It seems to me that one has to overcome the scientist’s irrational attitude towards goal-directedness or purposiveness. Teleology is a fact of life, a fundamental feature of life-processes, including evolution.

Stability is the goal

To say that a cybernetic system maintains its homeostasis, and that its constituent parts co-operate with it in this enterprise, is to say that its goal is the maintenance of its homeostasis or stability – in effect the same thing.

This implies that Gaia does not seek to evolve, and that the changes that it undergoes are simply those that it must undergo in order to avoid bigger and more disruptive changes. They are but part of a dynamic and creative strategy for maintaining the stability of the total spatio-temporal system that constitutes Gaia. Indeed, it is only by adapting the particularities of its structure to environmental contingencies, that a dynamic system such as Gaia can best maintain the generalities of its structure and hence its stability or homeostasis.

Order and co-operation

If Gaia is to be capable of acting as a cybernetic system and of maintaining its homeostasis, then it must display that specific structure that enables it to do so. It quite clearly cannot merely be a random assortment of competitive individuals all frantically striving to achieve their own egotistic ends, as the neo-Darwinists maintain. Instead, Gaia must be seen, as Lovelock sees her, as a vast co-operative enterprise geared to the maintenance of its overall structure in the face of change.

Clearly competition occurs: but it is not the most fundamental relationship between living things. It is a secondary relationship. So too, there is selection, but such selection is operated by the various natural systems that make up the Gaian hierarchy on their constituent parts, rather than by the vague, undefined ‘environment’ of neo-Darwinists.

Its role, what is more, is not to assure the ‘survival of the fittest’ (in the sense of the most individualistic, and the most competitive), but on the contrary to eliminate such undesirable individuals, since they do not fit into Gaia’s co-operative structure. In this way selection helps to assure the survival of those who do not fit into the hierarchy of natural systems (families, communities, societies, ecosystems) of which Gaia consists and thereby contribute to the achievement of her overall strategy.

Evolution and anti-evolution

It must be noted that to attribute the above characteristics to the evolutionary process is simply to bring it into line with other life processes such as morphogenesis, behaviour and indeed the Gaian life process itself as depicted by Lovelock.

It is quite clear that these are living processes rather than mechanical ones, that they are dynamic rather than passive, orderly and goal-directed rather than random. It is equally clear that they are cybernetic processes each sub-process being monitored so that diversions from its proper goal are corrected by the overall life process. For this to be possible each must be seen as co-operative and contribute above all, to Gaia’s overall strategy rather than competitive and individualistic. Why should evolution, the life process that encompasses all others be different?

Finally, such life processes can go wrong. Nature is neither omniscient nor omnipotent. When life processes go wrong they are no longer under control. They cease to be properly co-ordinated, they become atomised and individualistic, order gives rise to disorder, and to further atomisation. Co-ordination ceases, competition and aggression take over. This atomisation process gives rise to undifferentiated or random Gaian tissue that rapidly replaces Gaia’s critical structure (that which she must display if she is to be capable of maintaining her homeostasis or stability).

When they occur at the level of the individual biological organism, these destructive processes are seen as pathological. For neo-Darwinists, however, they are the normal features of the evolutionary process. How can they be? Why should the all-encompassing life process behave in a diametrically opposite manner from that of all other life processes? Is it not apparent that neo-Darwinists, still more so sociobiologists, have got it completely wrong; that they have failed to distinguish between pathology and physiology: between the growth of a malignant tumour and the development of differentiated tissue – between anti-evolution and evolution?

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