The politics of damming (alternative version)

There is little doubt, too, that the primary motive for the Sudanese government’s plan to push ahead with the building of the Jonglei Canal after the ending of the civil war in the Southern Sudan lay in the desire to consolidate its victory and complete the integration of the North and South. Indeed, the Commissioner for the project was quite specific as to the canal’s political advantages:

“Historically, the rift between North and South has increased in the past because of the lack of communications. The Sudd has always been a barrier. And that is why the Sudanese in the northern part tend towards the Middle East rather than Africa. Our link with Africa and with the South in particular was weakened because of the difficulty of communication.” [36]

But, whilst the Commissioner saw the Jonglei Canal as an instrument of reconciliation, others were less sanguine. Indeed, rumours that the area would be colonised by Northerners (and particularly Egyptians) led to riots in 1974.

Indeed, Sheridan argues that in many areas of the arid Western United States, “human systems are exceeding the carrying capacity of their natural life support systems”. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that any sensible conservation measures will be introduced voluntarily. The reason lies in the availability of federal pork.

No-one, least of all the farmers in the area, want to be told that they must limit their use of water: instead, they see the solution lying in the massive water projects which the politicians promise to build with federal funds. Sheridan cites the city of Tucson’s response to its dwindling groundwater supply as typical of the problem. Thus, he writes:

“Limiting water consumption. . . would seem to be the logical solution, but it apparently has not been politically feasible. Many of the people who have moved to this desert oasis from parts of the country with much wetter climates and have brought with them water consuming habits such as lawn watering that are ill-suited to the desert. More importantly, to limit water use is to limit economic growth, and many vested interests in the area – developers, construction companies, financial institutions – have a big stake in continued economic growth. So, instead of conserving water or doing without more water, cities such as Tucson look to the federal government to provide inexpensive water.” [42]

States within States

If the eagerness of politicians to bring home the pork is one side of the dam-building coin, the power of those institutions which build and plan dams and other water projects is the other. Handling vast budgets, and enjoying considerable political power themselves, they are well-versed in the art of lobbying. For example, George Laycock recalls how one civil servant, working for the US Corps of Engineers, went about “handling” a congressman he wished to interest in a project. The civil servant told a biologist from the US Fish and Wildlife Service:

“We maintain dossiers on each member of the Appropriations Committee. When one of these congressmen came to New Orleans recently, we were ready for him. One of our people took a friend of his to dinner in Washington just to learn more about him. We found out that he was a diabetic. So, when he arrived in New Orleans, his air-conditioned limousine was already equipped with a refrigerator stocked with everything he might need, including insulin.” [43]

Whatever the means used to obtain its influence in congress, the US Corps of Engineers – together with the Bureau of Reclamation – undoubtedly wields considerable political power on Capitol Hill. When in 1979, President Carter tried to put through a bill which would have created a new department, the Department of Natural Resources, and made it responsible for reviewing water projects, his efforts were stymied by the Corps and its allied agencies. Later, in 1980, Carter was forced to lift his presidential veto on a proposed bill which would have sanctioned $4.2 billion worth of water projects – a bill he had previously called

“a travesty, wasteful, destructive and expensive.” [44]

Elsewhere we find agencies which are equally powerful. Thus Tasmania’s Hydro-Electric Commission (HEC) has been accused of being a state within a state. As Peter Thompson of the Australian Conservation Foundation writes,

“For more than fifty years, the Commission has played a virtually unchallenged role as Tasmania’s economic, social and land-use planner. It has been an organisation operating in a power vacuum, created by a succession of parliaments which have never insisted on the public accountability of the HEC.” [45]

Thompson is not alone in expressing that view of the Commission. Other, more official, bodies have also voiced growing concern at the power now enjoyed by the HEC. Thus, in 1980, Tasmania’s own Directorate of Energy noted with alarm that the Commission was “sounding out” potential customers for its hydro-electric power without referring to other government departments.

“It would seem that the Hydro-Electric Commission has been permitted, in the absence of adequate policy guidance, to act as a de facto and largely autonomous, economic planning agency. This is indisputably not its role.”

Earlier, in 1974, a committee of inquiry into the HEC’s plans to flood Tasmania’s Lake Pedder expressed harsh criticisms of “the limited scope of the Commission’s planning objectives and evaluation criteria . . . and the narrow scope of the Commission’s professional expertise”. Indeed, the Committee of Inquiry argued:

“It appears to be a close knit and tightly disciplined organisation and might be considered the archetype of the kind of government instrumentality (which has been) described as a ‘guild authority’. Such organisations are common amongst public works agencies in Australia, particularly in the water resources field. They tend to internalise expertise to avoid independent review of their proposals, to discourage public knowledge of their activities and to have limited (generally single purpose) objectives.

Because of their staffing structure and the nature of their charter, such organisations are ill equipped to handle problems which involve multi-objective planning, environmental considerations or inter disciplinary co-operation. (Some organisations react by drawing within themselves and refusing to acknowledge that problems outside their own field or expertise exist. The Hydro-Electric Commission was one such organisation in 1967. The experience of this Committee suggests that it is still very much so.” [46]

That view of the commission has been amply born out in the ten years since the Committee of Inquiry sat. Indeed, nothing could better illustrate the HEC’s tunnel vision and unwillingness to accept criticism than its reaction to the international outcry over its plans to dam the Franklin River. It was not until the High Court of Australia ruled that the area (which had been included in the World Heritage List as an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty) should be preserved that the HEC agreed to halt work on the dam.

Conclusion

Such outright disregard for international opinion is exceptional. Nevertheless, the determination shown by the HEC to build the Franklin River Dam is symptomatic of a more general tendency within the industry to push ahead with projects apparently regardless of the case against them.

The record makes it quite apparent that figures have frequently been falsified in order to win approval for projects which – on the basis of any objective analysis – would never be sanctioned, let alone constructed. Indeed, it would appear that those who stand to gain politically and financially from the building of a large dam are willing to go to Inordinate lengths to ensure that it will be built.

Among other things, they are willing purposefully to mislead those who must be persuaded of the dam’s desirability and viability before the go-ahead to build it will actually be given. This they do by grossly exaggerating the dam’s likely benefits and seriously underestimating its probably costs – in particular its social and ecological costs which, as we have seen, are often totally ignored.

The power, prestige and financial resources of the politicians, bureaucrats and industrialists involved in dam projects greatly facilitates that deceit – as does the credulity and apathy of the public. Moreover, unlike the authorities, those who oppose dams – often local tribal or peasant leaders, obscure academics or youthful environmentalists – have meagre financial resources and little credibility.

To add to their difficulties, they must also confront the entrenched belief that large – scale water development schemes are an essential part of the process of economic development – a process which we have been taught to see as the only means of combating poverty and malnutrition, and of assuring health, longevity and prosperity for all.

To challenge dams is thus to challenge a fundamental credo of our civilisation.

References

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